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Duverger’s Law is a dead parrot. Outside the USA, first-past-
the-post voting has no tendency at all to produce two party
politics
Political science has very few ‘laws’, perhaps explaining why the discipline has so stubbornly
clung onto Maurice Duverger ’s famous claim that countries using first-past-the-post voting
systems will always have two party politics. It is no exaggeration to say that this proposition
still underpins whole fields of research. Yet Patrick Dunleavy explains that modern theory
and better evidence now show that the alleged ‘Law’ has lost all credibility.
All elections (indeed all competit ions) have a horse race element in which most attention
f rom the media, elites and voters themselves tends to f ocus on the top two contenders,
as much in proportional representations contests as in Brit ish-style voting systems. Yet the most
f amous ‘law’ in polit ical science, coined by Frenchman, Maurice Duverger in the early 1950s, holds that
the operations of  f irst-past- the-post voting system with single-member districts directly and strongly
tends to cause two party polit ics.
So the USA, UK, India, Canada and other Westminster systems should all be two-party polit ies in this
perspective, if  not at the aggregate national level, at least at the level of  contests in each local
constituency. Modernized and made more operational by Gary Cox in an inf luential 1997 book, Making
Votes Count, Duverger ’s Law still has so many thousands of  cites in polit ical science literature that no
practicable citations count is really f easible. (Google Scholar yields over 37,000 ref erences, and Google
Books nearly 9,000 more, but both cover mostly since the mid-1990s).
Duverger claimed that his ef f ect operated in two ways. First, polit icians know that a party can only ever
win a seat by coming top in a local election district (or constituency) – that is, by winning the largest pile
of  votes (a plurality), whether or not the party has a local majority. So if  you are not going to be in the
top two parties locally, why stand? Nationally, what’s the point of  coming second, third, or f ourth in lots
of  seats without winning any – the tradit ional f ate of  liberals in the UK since the 1930s. As a result, third
and f ourth parties don’t stand, and if  they do, they quickly die out.
Second, voters know that only the top two parties are contenders, so why ‘waste’ their one and only
vote on supporting an also-ran party that is going to come in at a third, f ourth or lower place? The
pressure to make a dif f erence pushes voters instead to back the top two and leave the rest to wither on
the vine.
The USA
This logic still works in the USA, and my f irst chart shows how the resulting American party system looks.
(This chart and both subsequent ones are drawn f rom joint work with Rekha Diwakar). Going down to the
level of  450 seats in the House of  Representatives, the bottom axis shows seats where Republicans are
in the lead on the right hand side of  the chart, and seats where Democrats lead on the lef t-hand side.
The vertical axis shows the combined proportion of  votes in each locality backing third, f ourth or f if th
parties.
Chart 1: District outcomes in the US House of Representatives, 2006
Source: Dunleavy and Diwakar, 2011.
Duverger ’s prediction is completely borne out here. All the seats are piled along the bottom axis, of ten
with zero support f or third parties in two-party only contests. When there is any degree of  support f or
third and subsequent parties, it is almost always tiny or very minimal. The two coloured triangles show
zones where one of  the top two parties wins a clear majority (50% + 1) of  local votes in the election
district – the red zone being Republican seats and the blue zone being Democrat ones. Virtually all the
450 available seats in the House of  Representatives lie in one or other of  these coloured zones. Indeed
in quite a large number of  seats the leading party is piling up super-majority vote shares in the 70 to 90
per cent range.
The only odd seats with higher level of  third party support actually occur not in the middle white areas
(as one might expect) but in these high dominance areas. These outlier results do not genuinely mean
high levels of  third party voting however – instead they just ref lect a local Republic dominance that is so
complete that no Democrat candidate will stand and lose their money doing so, and vice versa in the
Democrat majority areas. Here voters denied a major party choice plump f or the closest they can get to a
viable opponent – f or instance, rightwing voters denied a Republican candidate to support will back the
Libertarian. So even these cases do not undermine Duverger, but instead underline one-party dominance
areas.
But the f act that one country appears to of f er strong support to Duverger ’s Law is not in itself  very
helpf ul, since the USA has many other f eatures that might conduce to the same ef f ect – including a
Presidential system, the absence of  socialism, a polit ical plutocracy, an absence of  much limits on
campaign spending and polit ical advertising, etc.
Two other large FPTP countries
So the question that needs answering is whether this same pattern occurs at the local district level in all
plurality rule voting systems, as Duverger deemed it would? My second chart shows the situation in
Great Britain and it should be immediately obvious that the pattern here is completely dif f erent f rom
America.
Chart 2: Constituency outcomes in the 2005 general election, Great Britain
Source: Dunleavy and Diwakar, 2011
Here no local contests at all produce results either on or even near the bottom axis of  the chart. And
very f ew lie within the shaded triangle areas f or Conservative and Labour local majorit ies. There are
almost no seats where any party gets more than two thirds of  the vote. All these ef f ects occur because
the whole cluster of  seats is lif ted of f  the bottom axis, with more than 15 per cent of  the available votes
going to third, f ourth and smaller parties in virtually every constituency across the country.
There is clearly still some two-party f ocusing going on in Brit ish elections, as there is any election. But in
addition, of  course, the upper part of  the overall triangle here is thickly populated with seats where the
Liberal Democrats, Scottish Nationalists and Welsh Nationalists have come f irst and won the
constituency (shown as brown dots). So in every respect, this is a very dif f erent chart f rom that of  the
USA.
Let’s look now at the world’s largest plurality rule voting country, India, shown in my third chart. There the
pattern is radically dif f erent again. Here there is quite a big bunching of  seats close to the bottom axis,
and some even on the axis itself . But even in this minority of  seats, almost nowhere does any candidate
get more than two thirds of  votes. And seats in the areas where the two leading party blocs have local
majorit ies are clearly a minority – the BJP being the orange shaded area and the Congress being the
green. Even at the bottom of  the chart, most of  the seats lie in the middle white area where neither of
the big party blocs has a local majority.
Chart 3: District outcomes in the Indian Lok Sabha elections in 2004
Source: Dunleavy and Diwakar, 2011
There is a second prominent f eature of  the India chart, namely the large ‘mushroom cloud’ of  seats that
surges up f rom the white areas at the bottom to the top of  the overall triangle. The top zone here
encompasses seats (shown as blue dots) where parties other than Congress or BJP win or dominate
local voting, including the Communists and many dif f erent regional and local parties.
Facing facts, revising theories
Any physical scientist looking at these three charts could tell straight away that we are looking at three
radically dif f erent systems. The idea that parties or voters are behaving in the same ways across them is
deeply unlikely. The f actors leading to perf ect two party polit ics in the USA cannot be general to all
plurality rule systems – they must instead be specif ic to the American polit ical context. Incidentally perf ect
two-party systems like this are now f ound almost nowhere outside the USA, except f or a f ew small
Caribbean nations. In particular, all the major Westminster system countries have shown strong trends
towards multi-partism. For a t ime in 2010 indeed the UK, Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand (which
moved to PR) all had coalit ion or minority governments – subsequently Canada moved back to a majority
Conservative administration.
There are probably many reasons why polit ical scientists have clung on to the bogus ‘Law’ f or so long.
American scholars are notoriously prone to ethno-centric thinking, and f or them two party polit ics seems
the ‘natural order ’ of  things, and coalit ion government dangerously f uzzy and anarchic. This slant is
reinf orced f or rational choice theorists like Cox, who want neat mathematical models with clear
equilibrium predictions. And the intuit ive tug of  Duverger ’s two mechanisms (discouraging small parties
f rom standing and voters f rom backing them) is still strong.
Here, though, new theory has hugely compromised the scope of  the Law’s operations. For example, in a
f ine 2010 paper the US polit ical scientists Eric Dickson and Ken Sheve use rational choice proximity
models to predict that no contest should end up with more than two thirds of  votes f or one party. The
logic here is that a local majority of  67 per cent or more can af f ord to split its vote across two parties,
knowing that its biggest f action will still always win over any opposition party. By doing so, the majority of
the large local majority can always advance their welf are. This logic works perf ectly in the UK and India,
as the charts above show (with no seats above the 67% majority level), but not at all in the USA.
There is a huge debate to be had about why Duverger ’s law now is junk. Did the Duvergerian mechanisms
once work, but have now ceased to apply? Have voters and parties ceased to worry about ‘wasting’ their
ef f orts? Were Duverger ’s ‘theory’ elements always wrong intellectually? And so on…
But f or now, could polit ical scientists just accept (at last!) that the ‘law’ is bust and cannot be revived or
def ended any f urther? Arguing this case with colleagues, I still f eel like John Cleese in the f amous Monty
Python sketch, insisting on the completely, blindingly obvious. Duverger ’s law is extinct. It has ceased to
be. It is no more. This is a dead parrot.
This blog draws on recently published research by Patrick Dunleavy and Rekha Diwakar, ‘Analysing Multi-
party Competition in Plurality Rule Elections’, in the journal Party Politics. 
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